The Policy Statement identified key priority areas for developing smart grid standards.  These include: system security standards development and harmonization, effective communication and coordination, wide-area situational awareness, demand response, energy storage, and plug-in electric vehicles. 

In January 2010, the NIST issued a Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, Release 1.0 (“Roadmap”).  This Roadmap addressed gaps in smart grid standards and laid out priority action plans to deal with these gaps.  The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (“SGIP”) will aid NIST, as will the Cyber Security Working Group (“CSWG”) within the SGIP.  Palmer’s presentation indicated that Commission Staff expects that the first group of standards might be available for the Commission’s consideration by late summer.

Palmer’s presentation also included a recommendation that the Commission institute a rulemaking proceeding when it receives the first group of standards, and should also seek public comment on any related issues, including whether each standard satisfies the Energy Independence and Security Act, which ordered the Commission to create smart grid standards.  Staff also recommended that when examining standards, the Commission should look to three criteria, such as:

• Whether sufficient consensus has been reached;
• Whether the standard is necessary for smart grid functionality and interoperability in interstate transmission of electric power and regional and wholesale electricity markets; and
• Whether there are known cyber security issues with the standard.

Staff recommended that the Commission look to National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (“NTTAA”) for guidance to determine if sufficient consensus has been reached.  Next, Staff recommended that the Commission rely on documents that NIST prepares to find if a standard is necessary for functionality and operability of smart grid.  Finally, Staff recommended that the Commission rely on recommendations of the CSWG to determine if there are known cyber security issues with the standards.

A copy of the presentation is available here.

 Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), joined by a group of 40 co-sponsors, including three Democrats, introduced the resolution in January under the Congressional Review Act (see March 5, 2010 edition of the WER).  The resolution would have prevented EPA from regulating GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act. 

 Under Senate procedural rules, resolutions introduced under the Congressional Review Act do not need 60 votes in the Senate and can be adopted by a simple majority.  Although the resolution may have had difficulty passing the House, and almost certainly would have been vetoed by President Obama, it was intended to force a vote on whether the Clean Air Act is an appropriate vehicle for regulating GHG emissions.

 Some possible supporters of the resolution decided to oppose it based on reports that the Majority Leader had promised a vote on a bill sponsored by Senator Rockefeller (D-WV).  Senator Rockefeller’s bill, which has not yet been formally introduced, would not prohibit EPA regulation as did the Murkowski resolution but would delay such regulation for a period of two years.  It is unclear at this time if and when the Senate will vote on Senator Rockefeller’s bill. 

 Also in the wings is possible legislation by Senators Carper (D-DE) and Casey (D-PA) that may not yet have been drafted but would, at least reportedly, delay regulation for one year and also codify EPA’s tailoring rule.  Thus, it remains uncertain whether renewed efforts will be made in Congress to prevent EPA regulation of GHG emissions; such regulation is scheduled to commence in January 2011.

The 2010-2012 plan is an update of the 2008 Three-to-Five-Year Strategic Plan.  However, that plan focused on WECC transitioning from a voluntary and member-driven organization to a Regional Entity delegated by FERC and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) to enforce mandatory reliability standards.  In December 2009, a strategic planning working group was selected to finalize the 2010-2012 plan. 

The four strategies that will guide WECC’s actions over the next few years are:

1. Transitioning operational authority away from the WECC Board of Directors to WECC management;
2. Establishing a regional leadership role by coordinating with and supporting organizations that impact WECC’s mission of assuring reliability in the Western Interconnection;
3. Producing and disseminating credible data, information, and analysis; and
4. Performing WECC’s role as Regional Entity under the NERC delegation agreement.

Each year the WECC’s CEO will report to WECC’s Board of Directors on accomplishments from its strategic plan.  If necessary, the CEO will make recommendations on how to refine action priorities. 

A copy of the WECC strategic plan is available at http://www.wecc.biz/committees/BOD/Shared%20Documents/2010-2012%20WECC%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf.

The legislation is the revised version of H.R. 2165, a 2009 bill sponsored by Representative John Barrow (D-GA), subcommittee Chairman Ed Markey (D-MA), and committee Chairman Henry Waxman (D-CA). 

The day before the subcommittee voted on the GRID Act, FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff testified before the subcommittee about the serious nature of potential cyber attacks on the grid.  He told the subcommittee that the bill would give the Commission the necessary authority to address both system vulnerability and cyber attacks. 

Under the bill, the President could declare a threat if there is a substantial likelihood of a cyber attack, electromagnetic weapon attack, geomagnetic storm, or direct physical attack on the bulk power infrastructure.  The President’s emergency order would terminate under three circumstances: when the president deems a threat to no longer exist, when FERC determines the emergency measures are no longer needed, or if one year lapses from the date of the emergency order.  The President would be able to extend the emergency order if the threat continues beyond one year.

In addition to providing authority to address immediate threats, the GRID Act would also give FERC authority to mandate measures to protect against system “vulnerabilities” if it finds that the North American Electricity Reliability Corp. (“NERC) standards are insufficient.  FERC could coordinate with the Department of Energy (“DOE”) and agencies in Canada and Mexico to develop such reliability rules.  However, if NERC subsequently issues new standards addressing the vulnerabilities, FERC must rescind its corresponding standards.  

The law also directs NERC to create a large transformer standard allowing utilities to comply either individually or jointly. Large transformers can take up to two years to construct, so allowing entities to sell each other spare transformers in the event of an attack should ensure that utilities have adequate supplies of large transformers to replace any destroyed in a physical or cyber attack. 

Finally, the bill directs FERC to review the security of electricity infrastructure on military bases.  Under the bill, the President would designate up to one hundred domestic facilities that are critical to U.S. defense.  FERC must then coordinate with the DOE to review the security of the interconnecting facilities.  If FERC identifies vulnerabilities in those facilities, it could order protective measures in order to protect the facility.
 
A copy of the committee print of the Grid Act is available here.

The IRC represents most of the North American Grid Operators throughout the United States and Canada.  The report estimated about 684,000 of the one million PEVs will be located in regions served by Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) and Independent System Operators (“ISOs”).  In order to fully analyze the impact of these new PEVs, the report:

• Identified the operational, load, and price impacts to the grid from PEVs;
• Identified potential PEV prices;
• Established adaptations that might be necessary to incorporate PEV services into existing markets and provide a standardized approach to mobile loads;
• Listed key technologies, communications, cybersecurity, and protocols required to enable PEV products and services; and
• Established the types of investments in Information Technology infrastructure needed to integrate PEVs, and estimated their costs.

Although charging all the PEVs simultaneously could have detrimental effects on the grid, staggering the cars by eight hours would drop the additional load to just 819 MW.  If the cars were staggered by twelve hours, the new load would decrease to about 546 MW.  Also, if the grid were to use the car batteries as energy storage devices, PEVs could actually improve grid reliability.  

According to the report, California will see the largest increase in new load, with the California ISO expected to see up to 1,480 MW with the roll-out of PEVs.  The report also predicated that initial sales of PEVs will be in the large urban areas of the Northeast and on the West Coast.  In terms of cost, the report estimated that each grid operator can expect to incur a $265,000 cost to upgrade the system, $80,000 for upgrades to software and improved reliability, and a monthly cost ranging from $480 to $2,080 for secure communications.  Additionally, each aggregator is expected to spend $70,000 on a one-time cost to support connectivity between the aggregator and the ISO or RTO.

A copy of the full report by the IRC is available at http://www.isorto.org/atf/cf/%7B5B4E85C6-7EAC-40A0-8DC3-003829518EBD%7D/IRC_Report_Assessment_of_Plug-in_Electric_Vehicle_Integration_with_ISO-RTO_Systems_03232010.pdf.